for animals are supposed, ideally at least, to motivate the framing of the zoo as a particular kind of space (though commercial interests have ways of subverting or by-passing such principles). The guide notes and explanations attempt to position the viewer as this concerned, responsible and democratic subject. It is reasonable to claim then that in diffusing particular kinds of knowledges and in forming subjects for such knowledges, collections operate mainly through the construction of a gaze, though the latter works effectively only in correlation with other apparatuses, for instance that of education, which prepares the subject for the practice of viewing and valuing collections in determinate ways, though clearly the subject positions or identities constituted by the gaze can be refused, provided mechanisms for such dissident disidentifications exist in the culture.

As a category, then, the collection stands at the threshold of a number of domains: it is part of technologies of the social, participating in the formation of identities and of publics, yet at the same time it functions as the visible trace intimating the invisible and haphazard history of knowledge whilst remaining as testimony to yearnings and pleasures that weave biographies into the history of communities and their deeds. Collections are monuments and archives, the repository of a past and the legacy to be preserved. They inscribe the having been of a culture, preserving it for the present and the future, so that the knowledge and the memory that it inscribes can continue to be the object of a reflection on the way of life of the collectivity. Within the context of a global knowledge, such a reflection should trigger the work of memory aligned with working through in the psychoanalytic sense, that is, aligned with a critical hermeneutics.

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Classification and Human Language

Mark Donohue

Classification has a prehistory. Long before people were writing about classification, or listing classes, they were *doing* it, whenever they spoke.

The human propensity to classify the world is reflected universally in language, at many levels and in many ways. At its most fundamental, all languages minimally distinguish the pronouns *I* and *you*; many (if not most) languages accord special grammatical privileges to *I* and *you*, opposed to the rest of the world, and yet others put the dividing line somewhere else, maybe including dogs but excluding insects in a privileged 'human and most animate' category. Regardless of where the line between 'privileged' and 'less privileged' lies, the

tendency towards classification is rife and only just begins with the special status of *you* and *me*.

The parts of the body, as a group or in parts, can reflect classificatory principles: when fingers and toes are 'blossoms of hands' and 'blossoms of feet' respectively, as they are in many languages of central Indonesia such as Tukang Besi (Donohue, 1999), we can see the classification of the body into equal upper and lower parts. Foley (1997) describes this upper and lower division for Watam, showing that all parts of the upper limbs have a classification that is perfectly parallel with the lower limbs. The classification of the extremities of humans (fingers and toes) and the extremities of plants and animals (wing-tips and blossoms) into the same units also reflects a pan-species set of classificatory principles. The use of the same lexical item to specify 'grass', 'leaf' and 'hair', or the use of the same lexical item to express both the start and the end of a process (such as a single item covering 'tree/wood/fire', or a single word for 'stomach/faeces', as is common in New Guinea) signifies a division of the world into perceived classes, just as much as does its absence in those languages that do not collapse these terms.

Without formal gender we also find formal and functional classification, and the two systems meeting. In the One language of Papua New Guinea the animal world is classified into *tolla* 'birds', *mulu* 'meat animals', and *pompone* 'water dwelling creatures'. Another functional classification applies as well as this locational system, and, for instance, a cassowary, which although winged and feathered is flightless, is counted as a *pi'i mulu* 'ground animal', while a *saumu* 'tree kangaroo (generic)' is a *tiri mulu* 'upper animal'. Other *pi'i mulu* are the mammals of the ground: rodents, pigs, wallabies, while other members of the *tiri mulu* group are all the flying birds. Likewise various *oini* 'bandicoot (generic)' are classified as *tiri mulu*, *pi'i mulu*, or *fola mulu* 'water animals' based on their habitat. While they are all *mulu*, in opposition to *pompone* and *tolla*, certain of their members can be functionally grouped with *tolla* or *pompone* based on their behaviour, rather than their structure.

The most obvious, and overt, expression of classification in language, and the one that has received the greatest attention from linguists and others, involves gender. Dividing the world into masculine and feminine (and more) parts is overt classification at its most obvious. The basis for the classification can be formal (based on the perceived salient shape: long, thin objects are masculine, short and squat objects are feminine), functional (women's tools versus men's tool, for instance), or a mixture of the two. In Skou, a language from New Guinea, the world is classed as feminine or non-feminine, and these two poles contrast in dynamic ways. While non-feminine is the unmarked category, semantically, feminine represents the natural, the biological, the unordered and unpredictable. The land, with all its mysteries, is classed as feminine, while the transparent sea is non-feminine. A canoe is an ordered, societal tool, crewed by men, that is used to travel on the sea; it is classed, however, as feminine, in order to maintain an opposition with the predominantly non-feminine environment. Similarly water in its natural state, a river or a pool in the jungle, is classed as feminine; but when brought (typically by women) into the village, another feminine domain, it is reclassified as non-feminine, to maintain a distinction with 'wild' water, and a distinction with its new environment. (Non-feminine domains include food gardens, non-feminine by virtue of their being typically tended by men, houses, situated in 'feminine' villages but built by men, and islands and mountain tops, non-feminine on the basis of their shape.)

And the apparently arbitrary can enter the picture: in Burmeso, while third persons can be masculine or feminine, all first persons (*I*, *me*) are feminine, and all second persons (*you*) are masculine. Here the classification has moved from the formal and functional to the purely grammatical. Interestingly, native speakers often create ad hoc explanations for these classification systems, even in the face of counter-examples; I have heard Dutch speakers 'explain' the (to them) 'masculine' versus 'feminine' gender system in terms of shape characteristics of the nominals concerned, even in the face of clear counter examples. This parallels the continued citation of what has become (in some circles) known as 'The Great Eskimo Snow Hoax', in which Eskimo languages are asserted to have a vast number of words for snow (or ice), whereas in fact not only do the Inuit (or Eskimo) languages not have any such vast store of lexicon, but English contains at least as many lexical roots for these concepts, at least in the English spoken by avid skiers. As Pullum (1991) points out, people always have enough words to describe the world around them; a typographer recognizes more words for different fonts than does the average academic, but we do not find this exceptional or noteworthy. The use of classification as a tool in categorizing the world around us is so pervasive that we cease to think of it as categorization. Examples, such as the divisions of the natural world in One, which branch and then rejoin in parallel and overlapping systems, suggest that perhaps life in a society without such continual categorization of humans into archetypes such as doctor, professor, brick-layer, politician, etc. allows for a more complex conceptualization of the non-human world as well. But conceptualize it, and classify it, it does.

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Classification in French Social Theory

Derek Robbins

In attempting to represent *le modèle politique français* recently, Pierre Rosanvallon (2004) has argued that the exceptionalism of the French political tradition lies in the continuous oscillation between 'Jacobin' state-centredness and civil society, between 'political' and 'civil' democracies. Similarly, the French intellectual tradition in the modern period can be characterized as a continuous oscillation between the rationalist a priorism of the Cartesian tradition and the biological experientialism of Rousseauism. This epistemological oscillation is apparent in competing attitudes towards encyclopaedic classification.

The legacy of Cartesian dualism – the separation of the mind from the extended material universe – made possible the accumulation of objective knowledge by the Encyclopédistes. Diderot's entry on 'Encyclopédie' in Volume V of the *Encyclopédie [Encyclopedia]*, 1755, defined the goal of the venture as being to 'rassembler les connaissances éparses sur la surface de la terre, d'en exposer le système général aux hommes avec qui nous vivons . . .' (to gather together the knowledge which is scattered over the earth and to display its general system to the men with whom we live). Diderot was not proposing a (Linnaean) classification of objective (botanical) phenomena, nor, like his fellow Encyclopédiste Rousseau, author of *Emile*, was he emphasizing the subjective frame of reference of knowledge construction. Rather Diderot sought to order dispersed knowledge, as a contemporary antiquarian, without claiming either to organize things-in-themselves or to say anything about the principles of organization with which people operate.

The indigenous French philosophical tradition did not itself generate a Kantian resolution of the relationship between a priori and empirical knowledge. It was Comte – with little interest in epistemological questions – who sustained the endeavour of the Encyclopédistes, commencing, in 1829, the series of 60 lectures which were to be published as the *Cours de Philosophie Positive [Course of Positive Philosophy]* between 1830 and 1842. After offering general preliminary remarks and then giving lectures on mathematics, Comte provided an account of knowledge based upon a differentiation between the 'sciences des corps bruts' (of raw bodies) – astronomy, physics and chemistry – and the 'sciences des corps organisés' (organized bodies) – physiology and social physics or sociology. The principle of organization of Comte's classification of knowledge remained objective but it had become historical rather than a-temporal. In past historical periods, humans had had recourse, first of all, to an explanatory frame of thinking that was theological and, next, to one which was metaphysical, and it was only in the present that a comparable frame, based on positive scientific observation, was now in the process of establishing itself. In expounding this 'law' of the three states of development of human thinking (to which corresponded systems of social organization), Comte claimed that it showed that *at every epoch*, some theory is necessary to link observed facts and also that at the *origins of human mental development* it was impossible for theories to be generated simply from observation. At its birth, Comte claimed, the human spirit was saved by theology from the impasse which was the